Facts
- In the summer of 1957, the claimant, while sunbathing in a car park, was injured when the defendant accidentally reversed his vehicle over her legs.
- The defendant’s action was unintentional.
- The claimant delayed issuing a negligence claim until 1961; by then, the three-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1939 (as amended) had expired.
- As a result, the claimant brought her claim under trespass to the person, believing the limitation might be longer or the claim might still be viable.
- The central point in dispute was whether trespass to the person applied to non-intentional direct injury.
Issues
- Whether a claim in trespass to the person may succeed where the defendant’s act causing direct physical harm was unintentional.
- Whether the law should continue to allow claims for trespass to the person for unintentional direct injury, or restrict such claims to intentional acts only.
- Whether the existence of the distinct tort of negligence affects the scope of trespass to the person.
Decision
- The court held that trespass to the person requires intentional conduct; negligence is the appropriate cause of action for unintentional direct harm.
- The claimant’s action failed because the facts demonstrated only negligence, not intentional harm.
- The court followed the reasoning in Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] VR 621, affirming that intention is necessary for trespass to the person.
- The scope of trespass to the person was limited to actions where there is an intent to cause harm or a deliberate act that results in harm.
- The decision clarified that claimants must bring personal injury actions under negligence, not trespass, where there is no evidence of intention.
Legal Principles
- Trespass to the person requires proof of intentional or deliberate action resulting in direct physical contact or harm.
- Unintentional acts, even if causing direct harm, are actionable only under negligence.
- The case refined the boundaries between negligence and trespass to the person by mandating that intent must be present for the latter.
- The distinction between these torts determines both the appropriate legal avenue for claims and the applicable limitation periods.
- The principles established in Letang v Cooper remain central in classifying causes of action arising from physical injury.
Conclusion
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 established that claims for trespass to the person require intentional action, thereby distinguishing this tort from negligence and clarifying both substantive and procedural approaches within personal injury claims.