Facts
- Lintz Cricket Club had played cricket on the same field for about 70 years.
- New residential houses were built adjacent to the cricket ground; Mrs. Miller purchased one of these homes.
- After Mrs. Miller moved in, cricket balls frequently landed in her garden, causing property damage.
- The cricket club installed a chain-link fence to mitigate the risk, but balls continued to enter her property.
- The club offered compensation for damage, but Mrs. Miller sought an injunction to stop cricket matches.
- The dispute centered on the conflict between Mrs. Miller's right to enjoy her property and the community’s interest in recreational cricket.
Issues
- Whether repeated incursions of cricket balls constituted an actionable nuisance and/or negligence.
- Whether Mrs. Miller’s claim was defeated by the fact that the cricket club’s activities pre-dated her residence (“coming to the nuisance”).
- Whether an injunction or damages was the appropriate remedy, particularly in light of the public interest in the club’s activities.
- The relevance and weight of public interest in determining remedies for nuisance.
Decision
- The court found the cricket club liable for both nuisance and negligence.
- It was held that the club’s repeated intrusion onto Mrs. Miller’s land constituted an unreasonable interference irrespective of the fact she had moved near the cricket ground.
- The defence of “coming to the nuisance” was rejected; prior existence of the activity did not preclude finding nuisance.
- The majority refused to grant an injunction, instead awarding damages. The social value of the cricket club and the public interest in recreational activities were deemed sufficient reasons to deny injunctive relief.
- Dissenting, Geoffrey Lane LJ would have granted an injunction, concluding damages were not adequate for the ongoing harm suffered.
Legal Principles
- Repeated physical interferences with land can amount to actionable nuisance.
- Negligence may be found where a defendant fails to take adequate precautions to prevent foreseeable harm.
- The doctrine that “coming to the nuisance” is not a defence was reaffirmed, consistent with Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11 Ch D 852.
- Courts possess discretion to grant damages instead of injunctions, moving beyond the traditional presumption in favor of injunctive relief where public interest or policy considerations are significant.
- The judgment established that public interest may justify denying an injunction even where nuisance is established.
Conclusion
Miller v Jackson confirmed no defence of “coming to the nuisance” exists and recognized courts’ expanded discretion to award damages instead of injunctions in nuisance cases where the public interest is engaged, thereby balancing private property rights with broader community benefit.