Facts
- Two minors, G and R, caused serious property damage by setting a fire.
- They were convicted of criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
- The previous law, established by Caldwell, applied an objective test for recklessness, holding defendants liable even if they did not actually foresee the risk.
- The House of Lords reviewed whether the objective or subjective standard for recklessness should apply.
Issues
- Whether the test for recklessness in criminal damage should be subjective (dependent on the defendant's actual awareness of risk) or objective (based on a reasonable person's viewpoint).
- Whether the Criminal Damage Act 1971 allows for an objective standard of recklessness.
- Whether it is fair to convict individuals who, due to youth or limited understanding, did not perceive a risk that a reasonable person would have noticed.
Decision
- The House of Lords overturned the minors' convictions, holding that recklessness requires proof the defendant was actually aware of the risk.
- The subjective standard for recklessness was restored, overruling the approach taken in Caldwell.
- It was emphasised that criminal liability should generally depend on the defendant’s actual state of mind, not on whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk.
- The wording of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 does not support an objective standard for recklessness.
Legal Principles
- Recklessness in criminal damage under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 requires subjective awareness of risk.
- Liability should be tied to the defendant’s actual knowledge and foresight, reaffirming individual responsibility in criminal law.
- Objective standards of recklessness are inappropriate where the accused lacks the capacity to appreciate risks that others might discern.
- The subjective test protects defendants, especially minors or those with limited understanding, from being unfairly convicted.
Conclusion
R v G and R restored the subjective test for recklessness in criminal damage, holding that liability depends on a defendant’s personal awareness of risk, and not on whether a reasonable person would have foreseen it, thereby supporting fairer outcomes, particularly for vulnerable defendants.