Learning Outcomes
This article explains how the standard of care in negligence is adjusted when the defendant is a child, including:
- The objective “reasonable child” test and how it modifies the general reasonable person standard for child defendants in negligence claims.
- The key reasoning and outcome in Mullin v Richards and how it guides analysis of ordinary school or playground horseplay.
- How courts evaluate foreseeability and magnitude of risk from the viewpoint of a child of the same age, intelligence, and experience.
- The principal factors relevant to breach for children, such as age, experience, nature of the activity, setting, supervision, and practicality of precautions.
- Situations where the adult standard may still apply because the child engages in inherently hazardous or typically adult activities, such as road use.
- The distinction between assessing breach by a child defendant and assessing contributory negligence where the claimant is a child.
- Techniques for applying these principles to SQE1-style multiple-choice and problem questions involving children allegedly in breach of duty.
SQE1 Syllabus
For SQE1, you are required to understand how the standard of care in negligence is determined and applied, including modifications for specific defendant types like children, and to apply this knowledge to factual scenarios to assess breach of duty, with a focus on the following syllabus points:
- The general objective standard of care (the reasonable person).
- The modified objective standard applied to children.
- Key case law illustrating the application of the standard to children (e.g., Mullin v Richards).
- Factors influencing the standard, such as the child's age and the nature of the activity.
- How to differentiate the child standard from standards applied to adults or professionals.
- When the adult standard may apply to a child engaging in an adult or inherently hazardous activity (by analogy with Nettleship v Weston).
- The relationship with contributory negligence where the claimant is a child (e.g., Gough v Thorne; Morales v Eccleston).
Test Your Knowledge
Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.
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What is the general standard of care applied in negligence?
- The standard of the defendant themselves.
- The standard of the most careful person possible.
- The standard of the reasonable person.
- The standard dictated by the claimant.
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How is the standard of care modified when the defendant is a child?
- Children are immune from negligence claims.
- The standard is lowered to that of a reasonable child of the same age and experience.
- The standard is raised because children are unpredictable.
- The standard is the same as for an adult.
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Which case involved two 15-year-old girls fencing with rulers?
- Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
- Donoghue v Stevenson
- Caparo Industries plc v Dickman
- Mullin v Richards
Introduction
Establishing a breach of duty is the second key element in proving negligence, following the establishment of a duty of care. A breach occurs when the defendant's conduct falls below the standard of care legally required in the circumstances. The general standard is objective – that of the ‘reasonable person’. However, the law recognises that this standard requires modification in certain situations, particularly when the defendant is a child. Understanding this adjustment is essential for applying negligence principles correctly. It also guards against two common errors: holding a child to an adult’s level of judgment in ordinary play, and, conversely, excusing a young person who undertakes dangerous adult activities where the adult standard may properly apply.
The General Standard of Care: The Reasonable Person
Before examining the standard applied to children, it is essential to recall the general standard. The law requires individuals to behave with the degree of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same circumstances (Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks (1856)). This is an objective standard, meaning it does not usually take into account the specific defendant’s personal characteristics, such as their level of experience or intelligence (Nettleship v Weston [1971]). The focus is on what level of care society expects from its members in a given situation. Courts calibrate the reasonableness of precautions by reference to factors such as the likelihood and seriousness of harm, cost and practicality of precautions, social value of the activity, and state of knowledge at the time (see Bolton v Stone; Paris v Stepney; Latimer v AEC; Roe v Minister of Health).
The Lower Standard for Children
The courts recognise that children cannot be expected to possess the same level of judgment, foresight, and understanding of risks as adults. Consequently, the objective ‘reasonable person’ test is adapted for child defendants.
Key Term: Standard of Care for Children
The standard by which a child's conduct is measured in negligence; it is the degree of care expected from an ordinary, prudent child of the same age, intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances.
This adjusted standard acknowledges that a child's capacity to appreciate danger and act safely develops with age and experience. It would be unfair and unrealistic to hold a young child to the same standard as a competent adult. In practice, there is no fixed minimum age below which a child can never be negligent, but the younger the child, the less likely a court is to find that they could reasonably have foreseen the relevant risk or appreciated how to avoid it.
Key Term: Reasonable child test
An objective yardstick applied to child defendants that asks what a reasonably careful child of the same age and with similar experience would have done in the circumstances, rather than what an adult would have done.
The Objective Nature of the Child Standard
While the standard is adjusted, it remains objective for that age group. The question is not whether this particular child did their best, but whether their conduct met the standard expected of a reasonably careful child of their age and experience. The usual breach analysis still applies: the court weighs the magnitude of the risk (likelihood and seriousness), the practicality of precautions, and the context of the activity. Importantly, the foreseeability of harm is assessed from the vantage point of a child of that age.
Key Case Law: Mullin v Richards [1998]
The leading case illustrating this principle is Mullin v Richards [1998] 1 WLR 1304 (CA). Two 15‑year‑old schoolgirls, engaged in playful fencing with plastic rulers, did not appreciate that a ruler might snap and cause serious injury. The Court of Appeal held that a reasonable 15‑year‑old would not have foreseen the risk of significant harm from such commonplace “horseplay”, and so there was no breach.
Worked Example 1.1
Two 15-year-old schoolgirls, Holly and Jessica, were engaged in a mock sword fight using plastic rulers during a lesson. One ruler snapped, and a fragment hit Holly’s eye, causing significant injury. Holly sued Jessica for negligence. Would Jessica be found in breach of duty?
Answer:
Applying Mullin v Richards, Jessica's conduct must be judged against the standard of a reasonable 15-year-old schoolgirl. The Court of Appeal held in Mullin that such horseplay was common, and the risk of serious injury from a snapping ruler was not one that a reasonable 15-year-old would foresee. Therefore, Jessica would likely not be found in breach of her duty of care.
Factors Considered
When applying the standard, courts consider:
- Age: The primary factor. A very young child might not be found negligent at all if they lack the capacity to understand the risk involved. Older children are expected to exercise greater care as their cognitive and risk-appraisal abilities mature.
- Experience: A child with particular experience in an activity might be expected to show more care in that context than an inexperienced child of the same age. Evidence of prior instruction, rules explained by adults, or repeated engagement in the activity can be relevant.
- Intelligence: While the standard is generally based on age, a child's individual intelligence might inform the assessment of what risks they could appreciate, though age remains the anchor.
- The Nature of the Activity: If a child engages in an activity typically considered ‘adult’ (e.g., driving a motor vehicle), they may be held to the higher, adult standard of care expected for that activity (Nettleship v Weston regarding learner drivers is relevant by analogy, although that case involved an adult learner).
- Setting and supervision: The environment (school, playground, street), the presence or absence of supervision, and adherence to rules can shape what risks are reasonably apparent to a child and what precautions are practical in the moment.
- Magnitude of risk and practicality of precautions: The more serious and likely the harm, the more care is expected even of a child; conversely, split-second movements in dynamic play may not allow for elaborate precautions.
Courts distinguish spontaneous, momentary lapses characteristic of ordinary play from behaviour that, even for a child, carries a significant and obvious risk of causing injury. For example, where a brief, impulsive collision occurs in a playground without any obvious hazardous conduct, breach may not be established; but deliberately throwing hard objects at others, even in play, may be treated differently given the evident risk of harm.
Key Term: Adult-activity principle
Where a child undertakes an activity that is ordinarily reserved for adults or inherently hazardous (e.g., driving), the law may apply the ordinary adult standard of care to that conduct.
Worked Example 1.2
Leo, aged 10, is cycling his bike on the pavement. He swerves suddenly to avoid a pedestrian and collides with Maya, knocking her over and causing her minor injuries. Maya claims Leo was negligent. The evidence shows Leo is an experienced cyclist for his age.
How would the court assess Leo's standard of care?
Answer:
The court would assess Leo's actions against the standard of a reasonable 10-year-old cyclist with similar experience. His experience is relevant. However, even an experienced 10-year-old might not possess the same traffic awareness or reaction speed as an adult. The court would consider if a reasonable 10-year-old cyclist would have foreseen the risk and could have avoided the collision by exercising appropriate care for that age and experience level. Swerving suddenly might be considered reasonable for a child startled by a pedestrian, even if an adult might have reacted differently.
Worked Example 1.3
Sanjay, aged 13, runs across a school playground during lunchtime and accidentally collides with a lunchtime supervisor who is walking through the same area. The supervisor suffers a fractured wrist and sues Sanjay for negligence.
Answer:
The standard is that of a reasonably careful 13‑year‑old in a playground context. Ordinary running and brief, impulsive movements during play are typical of children and do not necessarily involve a significant, foreseeable risk of injury. Unless Sanjay was doing something obviously dangerous (e.g., charging with intent, pushing, or engaging in rough play in a restricted area), a court is likely to find no breach because a prudent 13‑year‑old would not foresee a significant risk from ordinary running in a playground. The analysis mirrors the approach in cases where children’s brief lapses in a play setting were not negligent.
Applying the adult standard where appropriate
The fact that a defendant is under 18 does not automatically mean the child standard applies. Where a young person engages in activities that demand adult competence and carry serious risks to others, the ordinary adult standard may be appropriate. The policy reason is that the risk is created by choosing to undertake an adult activity, not by childhood per se. Context is key: operating a car or motorbike on public roads typically attracts the adult standard; riding a bicycle in a park ordinarily does not.
Worked Example 1.4
Aria, aged 17, rides an uninsured moped on a public road without a licence and collides with a pedestrian while attempting to overtake stationary traffic at speed. She argues that, as a minor, she should be judged by the standard of a reasonable 17‑year‑old.
Answer:
The nature of the activity is determinative. Riding a motor vehicle on public roads is an adult activity requiring adult competence. By analogy with Nettleship v Weston, the standard is that of the reasonably competent road user. The fact Aria is 17 does not lower that standard; on these facts, a breach is likely if her manoeuvre fell below that standard.
Relationship with Contributory Negligence
The same principles apply when assessing contributory negligence against a child claimant. A child is expected to take the degree of care for their own safety that is reasonable for a child of their age and experience. A very young child may be incapable of contributory negligence. The courts have repeatedly emphasised that findings against children must reflect realistic expectations of their judgment and impulse control.
- Gough v Thorne [1966]: A 13‑year‑old girl waved across by a lorry driver was not contributorily negligent; she had done what could be expected of a child of her age.
- Morales v Eccleston [1991]: An 11‑year‑old playing football and running into the road was found significantly contributorily negligent, reflecting that even at 11 the risk of traffic in a busy road is obvious.
- More recently, courts calibrate the percentage reduction to the child’s age, the clarity of the risk, and the surrounding circumstances (including, for example, vehicle speed and visibility).
Key Term: Contributory negligence (children)
A partial defence reducing damages where a child claimant’s own lack of care contributed to their injury, assessed by reference to what a reasonably careful child of the same age and experience would have done.
Worked Example 1.5
Amira, aged 13, crosses a busy road between parked cars at dusk wearing dark clothing. A driver travelling within the speed limit collides with her. Amira brings a negligence claim. How will the court approach contributory negligence?
Answer:
The court will ask what a reasonably careful 13‑year‑old would have done. Crossing between parked cars at dusk presents an obvious danger to an adolescent, and a reduction for contributory negligence is likely. The precise percentage will depend on all the circumstances, including the driver’s speed, lookout, lighting conditions, and Amira’s actions. If the driver was travelling lawfully and keeping a proper lookout, a substantial reduction may be applied; if the driver was also at fault (e.g., excessive speed), the reduction may be lower.
Exam Warning
Do not confuse the objective standard for a child with a purely subjective standard. The test is not whether this specific child did their best, but what a reasonable child of that age and experience would have done. Distinguish carefully between:
- A child defendant’s breach of duty (reasonable child test), and
- A child claimant’s contributory negligence (the same age‑sensitive approach, but applied to the claimant’s conduct to reduce damages).
Also, remember that for inherently dangerous adult activities, the child may be held to the adult standard. Do not import the criminal age of responsibility into civil negligence analysis; it has no bearing on breach.
Revision Tip
When analysing problem scenarios involving children, always state the modified standard clearly: “The standard of care is that of a reasonable child of [X] age with [relevant described] experience.” Then apply the facts to that specific standard, considering foreseeability from the viewpoint of such a child. Where the activity is arguably adult in nature, explain why the adult standard should apply and assess breach accordingly. Finally, if the child is the claimant, consider whether contributory negligence arises using the same age‑sensitive lens.
Further guidance and cross‑links
- The calibrated risk analysis used for adults (likelihood and seriousness of harm, practicality of precautions, social value) also guides child‑defendant cases, but the lens is the child’s reasonable appreciation of risk given their age.
- Ordinary play and “horseplay” in schools or parks are rarely negligent unless the behaviour involves obvious and significant risk even to children.
- Very young children are seldom found negligent. Procedurally, minors must litigate or be sued through a litigation friend, but this does not alter the applicable standard of care.
- Where injury arises in settings like schools or parks, separate duties may arise against occupiers or supervising adults (e.g., schools acting in loco parentis). These are distinct from a child’s potential liability and must be analysed under their own principles.
Key Point Checklist
This article has covered the following key knowledge points:
- The standard of care in negligence is generally objective – that of the reasonable person.
- This standard is modified for child defendants to reflect their age and experience.
- The test applied to children is that of a reasonable child of the same age and experience.
- Mullin v Richards is the leading authority on the reasonable child test in ordinary play.
- Courts consider age, experience, intelligence, the nature of the activity, setting, supervision, and the magnitude of the risk.
- Where a child undertakes an inherently adult activity (e.g., driving on public roads), the adult standard may apply.
- The same age‑sensitive approach applies to contributory negligence where the claimant is a child (e.g., Gough v Thorne; Morales v Eccleston).
- The foreseeability of harm, from the vantage of a child of that age, remains central to breach analysis.
- Very young children are rarely found negligent; there is no fixed minimum age, and procedure requires a litigation friend for minors.
- Distinguish child‑defendant breach from separate duties owed by occupiers or supervising adults, which are assessed under their own standards.
Key Terms and Concepts
- Standard of Care for Children
- Reasonable child test
- Adult-activity principle
- Contributory negligence (children)