Central government and accountability - Ministerial responsi...

Learning Outcomes

This article examines ministerial responsibility in the UK constitution, including:

• the core features and purposes of collective and individual ministerial responsibility as examinable constitutional conventions
• how collective responsibility operates in Cabinet practice, its main elements (unity, confidentiality, resignation), and recognised exceptions such as referendums and coalition agreements
• the scope of individual responsibility for departmental errors, policy failures, and personal misconduct, and how expectations of resignation are applied in practice
• the relationship between political accountability and legal accountability, with focus on judicial review, the Carltona principle, and limits of court enforcement
• the role of the Ministerial Code, civil service neutrality, and parliamentary mechanisms (questions, select committees, urgent questions, opposition days) in securing accountability
• how concepts of accountability and responsibility differ yet overlap, and why this matters when analysing responsibility gaps in exam scenarios
• the impact of confidentiality, freedom of information, and cases such as Attorney General v Jonathan Cape, M v Home Office, and Evans on ministerial accountability
• typical SQE1-style problem question patterns on ministerial responsibility and strategies for structuring concise, issue-led answers using facts, conventions, and case law
• ways to apply these principles to contemporary examples to test understanding and reinforce memory for multiple-choice and scenario-based questions

SQE1 Syllabus

For SQE1, you are required to understand the constitutional mechanisms that ensure accountability of central government, with a focus on ministerial responsibility, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

• the meaning and operation of collective ministerial responsibility
• the meaning and operation of individual ministerial responsibility
• the legal and political nature of ministerial accountability
• the role of conventions and their enforceability
• the relationship between ministerial responsibility and parliamentary scrutiny
• the Prime Minister’s role in enforcing the Ministerial Code and determining resignations
• the Carltona principle and its limits
• the distinction (and overlap) between accountability and responsibility
• how confidentiality and freedom of information rules affect Cabinet government
• how mechanisms such as select committees, urgent questions, and opposition business hold ministers to account

Test Your Knowledge

Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.

1. What is the difference between collective and individual ministerial responsibility?
2. Can a court enforce the resignation of a minister who misleads Parliament?
3. What is the Carltona principle, and how does it relate to ministerial responsibility?
4. Give an example of a situation where a minister might resign under the convention of individual responsibility.

Introduction

Ministerial responsibility is a core constitutional convention in the United Kingdom, ensuring that government ministers are answerable to Parliament for their actions and the actions of their departments. This principle is central to the accountability of the executive and underpins the operation of responsible government. Ministerial responsibility is not a legal rule but a convention, meaning it is not directly enforceable by the courts but is essential for effective parliamentary scrutiny.

At the collective level, responsibility ties the government to the confidence of the House of Commons and requires ministers to maintain a united public position. At the individual level, responsibility anchors the accountability of each minister for departmental activity, policy decisions, and personal conduct. Modern practice reflects the growth and complexity of government, the development of executive agencies, and the detailed expectations codified in the Ministerial Code. Although courts do not police conventions, legal principles such as Carltona and the availability of judicial review often intersect with ministerial accountability by ensuring public bodies act within the law.

The Nature of Ministerial Responsibility

Ministerial responsibility is divided into two main components: collective responsibility and individual responsibility. Both are conventions, not statutory rules, but they are fundamental to the functioning of the UK’s parliamentary system. Historically, collective responsibility developed alongside the Cabinet system and party politics, with the Loyal Opposition and parliamentary procedures (questions, debates, and committees) becoming central to scrutinising ministers. Today, these conventions operate within a framework that includes statutory safeguards, the impartial Civil Service, and robust parliamentary mechanisms.

Key Term: ministerial responsibility
Ministerial responsibility is the constitutional convention that government ministers are accountable to Parliament for government policy, departmental actions, and their own conduct.

Key Term: convention
A convention is a non-legal rule that is generally observed in constitutional practice but is not enforceable by the courts.

Collective Ministerial Responsibility

Collective responsibility requires that all ministers in the Cabinet support government decisions publicly, even if they disagreed privately during internal discussions. If a minister cannot support a government policy, they are expected to resign.

Key Term: collective ministerial responsibility
The convention that all Cabinet ministers must publicly support government decisions and policies, presenting a united front to Parliament and the public.

Main Features

• Public Solidarity: Ministers must defend government policy in public, regardless of personal views.
• Confidentiality: Cabinet discussions are confidential, allowing for open debate within government.
• Resignation: Ministers who cannot support a policy must resign from the Cabinet.
• Applicability to All Ministers: The obligation binds Cabinet members and other ministers; junior ministers and those outside Cabinet must also refrain from public dissent.
• Limited Exceptions: Collective responsibility can be set aside in exceptional circumstances (e.g., national referendums or specific coalition agreements) expressly authorised by the Prime Minister.

Confidentiality has been reinforced by practice and case law. Courts recognise a public interest in maintaining the secrecy of Cabinet deliberations to preserve frank discussion. In Attorney General v Jonathan Cape, the courts acknowledged that confidentiality can be protected through equitable principles of confidence, although protection weakens over time. Modern information law also shapes confidentiality: policy formulation and Cabinet documents may be protected by qualified exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, but disclosure can be ordered where the public interest test favours openness. The executive’s statutory “veto” certificate under FOIA is subject to judicial scrutiny; in R (Evans) v Attorney General, the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General’s attempt to override a tribunal decision ordering disclosure was unlawful.

Purpose

• Ensures government stability and coherence.
• Allows for frank discussion within Cabinet.
• Reinforces the principle that the government is accountable as a whole to Parliament.
• Prevents ministers from disassociating themselves from controversial or unpopular policies, thereby preserving clarity of accountability.
• Supports party discipline and clear lines of responsibility, while permitting limited departures when expressly authorised (e.g., the 1975 referendum on EEC membership; the 2011 AV referendum; the 2016 EU referendum).

Individual Ministerial Responsibility

Individual responsibility holds each minister accountable for the actions of their department and for their own personal conduct. Ministers are expected to answer to Parliament for departmental decisions, even if those decisions were made by civil servants.

Key Term: individual ministerial responsibility
The convention that a minister is accountable to Parliament for the actions of their department and for their own personal conduct.

Main Features (Individual)

• Departmental Oversight: Ministers are responsible for the performance and administration of their departments, executive agencies, and sponsored bodies.
• Duty of Candour to Parliament: Ministers must provide accurate and truthful information to Parliament and correct inadvertent errors promptly; knowingly misleading Parliament is expected to result in resignation under the Ministerial Code.
• Personal Conduct: Ministers must maintain high standards of personal integrity and avoid conflicts of interest; misconduct in private life can warrant resignation if it undermines public confidence or creates conflicts.
• Resignation: Ministers may be expected to resign for serious policy failures they own, egregious departmental maladministration that they cannot plausibly remedy, knowingly misleading Parliament, or personal misconduct incompatible with their duties.

In practice, a long-established framework helps reconcile departmental accountability with civil service anonymity. Following the Crichel Down affair, ministers were said to protect officials who acted on express orders or within policy, accept responsibility for minor errors while instituting remedies, and not defend reprehensible conduct unknown to them (though they remain answerable to Parliament for what went wrong). Over time, the rise of executive agencies and complex operations has prompted ministers to distinguish between policy failures (for which ministers accept responsibility) and operational failures (for which ministers give an account and implement corrective measures). Parliamentary committees and public scrutiny increasingly test these distinctions to prevent “responsibility gaps.”

Limits

• Ministers are not expected to resign for every minor error by their department.
• The threshold for resignation is political, not legal, and depends on the seriousness of the issue and political pressure.
• A distinction is often drawn between “taking responsibility” (which may involve apology, remedial action, or reorganisation) and “resigning,” which is reserved for grave failures or misconduct.
• Operational mistakes in large departments often lead to ministers giving an account and taking remedial steps instead of resigning, but this is scrutinised case by case by Parliament and the public.

Legal Aspects and the Carltona Principle

While ministerial responsibility is a political convention, some legal principles interact with it.

Key Term: Carltona principle
The legal principle that acts done by civil servants in a government department are treated as acts of the minister, who remains accountable for them.

The Carltona principle recognises that ministers cannot personally make every decision in large departments. Civil servants act on the minister’s behalf, but the minister remains answerable to Parliament for those actions. Courts have endorsed the principle widely: where a statute vests discretionary power in a minister, departmental officials can usually exercise it on the minister’s behalf unless the legislation requires personal exercise. The creation of executive agencies has not displaced Carltona; chief executives and officials may act as the minister’s alter ego within delegated frameworks, although some functions—particularly where statute or context implies personal ministerial attention—cannot be delegated in practice.

Ministers and departments also remain subject to the ordinary law. Injunctions may be granted against a minister, and non-compliance can constitute contempt of court. In M v Home Office, the House of Lords confirmed that ministers have no immunity from court orders; a minister could be held in contempt for disobeying an injunction.

Judicial Review and Ministerial Decisions

Ministerial decisions can be subject to judicial review if they are alleged to be unlawful, irrational, or procedurally improper. Judicial review ensures that ministers and departments act within the powers conferred by Parliament and respect public law principles. Courts, however, do not enforce the convention of ministerial responsibility itself; they only review the legality of ministerial actions. Equally, the courts will not question internal parliamentary procedures (for example, the Supreme Court in HS2 signalled judicial restraint concerning the processes of Parliament).

Legal accountability and political accountability operate in parallel:

• Legal accountability concerns whether decisions are lawful and procedurally proper; remedies include quashing unlawful decisions or granting injunctions.
• Political accountability concerns whether ministers have maintained confidence, told the truth to Parliament, and managed their departments appropriately; remedies include resignation, reshuffle, censure, or loss of confidence.

Worked Example 1.1

A minister is questioned in Parliament about a serious administrative error made by a civil servant in their department. The minister was unaware of the error until it became public.

Answer:
Under individual ministerial responsibility, the minister must answer to Parliament for the error, even if they were not personally involved. Whether resignation is required depends on the seriousness of the error and political circumstances. Often the minister will give an account, implement corrective action, and retain office unless the failure is grave or linked to misleading Parliament.

Worked Example 1.2

A Cabinet minister publicly criticises a government policy after it has been agreed by the Cabinet.

Answer:
This breaches collective ministerial responsibility. The minister is expected to resign if they cannot support the policy in public. The Prime Minister may, in exceptional circumstances, set aside collective responsibility for a specific issue (e.g., a referendum), but otherwise dissent requires resignation.

Worked Example 1.3

A department’s chief executive of an executive agency makes licensing decisions under powers vested in the Secretary of State. A claimant challenges the legality of a licence on the basis that the minister did not personally approve it.

Answer:
Under the Carltona principle, officials and agency leaders can act on behalf of the minister unless the statute requires personal ministerial exercise. The legality turns on statutory interpretation; if no personal requirement exists, the delegation is valid, and the minister remains politically accountable to Parliament for the agency’s actions.

Worked Example 1.4

A minister issues a certificate under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to veto disclosure of correspondence following a tribunal decision ordering release.

Answer:
Courts can scrutinise the legality of such a certificate. In Evans, the Supreme Court held that a minister’s veto cannot simply override a binding judicial decision without lawful and adequate justification. Regardless of the legal outcome, the minister is accountable to Parliament for decisions to refuse disclosure and must explain them within the framework of the Ministerial Code and FOIA.

Ministerial Responsibility and Parliamentary Accountability

Ministerial responsibility is central to the accountability of government to Parliament. It ensures that ministers can be questioned, held to account, and, if necessary, removed for failures in policy, administration, or conduct. The principle that the government must retain the confidence of the House of Commons continues to underpin responsible government. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was repealed by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022; the convention that a government losing confidence resigns or seeks dissolution has been restored to a conventional footing.

Mechanisms for Accountability

• Parliamentary Questions: Ministers must answer questions from MPs about government policy and departmental actions. Prime Minister’s Questions occur weekly. Accuracy, completeness, and timeliness are essential; errors should be corrected at the earliest opportunity.
• Urgent Questions: The Speaker may grant urgent questions requiring ministers to come to the House promptly to address pressing matters, increasing real-time accountability.
• Opposition Business: Allocated parliamentary time enables opposition-led debates and motions, including motions critical of government performance.
• Select Committees: Committees scrutinise departmental performance and can summon ministers and officials to give evidence. Committees have power to send for “persons, papers and records.” Ministers should require civil servants to assist committees, consistent with the Civil Service Code’s duties of impartiality and honesty. The Public Accounts Committee is especially influential in examining value for money and financial propriety.
• Liaison Committee: Composed of select committee chairs, it questions the Prime Minister, providing high-level scrutiny across government.
• Debates and Motions, including Confidence Motions: Parliament can debate government actions and, where appropriate, pass motions of censure or no confidence.

Key Term: Ministerial Code
The Ministerial Code is a set of rules and principles issued by the Prime Minister outlining the standards of conduct expected of government ministers.

The Ministerial Code consolidates core accountability principles approved by Parliament: collective responsibility; duty to account and be held to account; primary duty to provide accurate and truthful information; openness subject to public interest constraints; and ensuring civil servants giving evidence are helpful, truthful and full in their information. The Prime Minister is the ultimate judge of adherence, and enforcement is political.

The impartiality of the Civil Service is safeguarded by statute. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provides for civil service management and standards, with recruitment overseen by the Civil Service Commission. Civil servants serve the government of the day but must remain politically neutral, which supports consistent ministerial accountability to Parliament irrespective of party changes.

Exam Warning

Ministers are not legally required to resign for misleading Parliament or for departmental failures. The convention is enforced politically, not by the courts. The courts will not compel a minister to resign. However, courts can review the legality of ministerial actions (e.g., via judicial review) and will scrutinise any statutory attempt to override disclosure or procedural obligations.

The Political Nature of Ministerial Responsibility

Ministerial responsibility is enforced through political pressure, media scrutiny, and parliamentary mechanisms—not by law. The Prime Minister plays a key role in deciding whether a minister should resign. Ultimately, accountability is maintained through Parliament’s ability to remove the government by a vote of no confidence. In practice:

• Resignations more commonly follow personal misconduct, serious breaches of the duty of candour, or sustained departmental failings that erode confidence.
• Ministers frequently “take responsibility” by apologising and instituting corrective measures instead of resigning where failures are operational rather than policy-based.
• The distinction between accountability (giving an account and being held to account) and responsibility (being blameworthy for policy or conduct) is contested. Parliamentary committees and the House of Lords Constitution Committee have cautioned that the distinction should not allow responsibility gaps; accountability and responsibility often converge in practical terms.

Collective responsibility can be adjusted by political necessity in coalitions or during referendums. Setting aside the rule for narrow issues does not abolish accountability; ministers remain answerable for their departments and must continue to comply with the duty of candour. In devolved contexts, parallel conventions apply, but their operation can differ (for example, Northern Ireland’s power-sharing executive does not apply collective responsibility in the same way due to its unique constitutional design).

Revision Tip

When answering SQE1 questions, always distinguish between legal accountability (enforceable by the courts) and political accountability (enforced by Parliament and public opinion). Where a scenario raises both, address each separately and explain how they interrelate.

Worked Example 1.5

A Home Secretary faces criticism after operational failures in an executive agency lead to wrongful deportations. The minister did not order the actions but had set targets that were misunderstood by officials.

Answer:
The minister must give an account to Parliament and take responsibility for policy direction. If the failures are deemed policy-driven or the minister misled Parliament, resignation may follow. If the failures are operational, the minister may implement remedial measures, reorganise the agency, and remain in office, subject to political judgment.

Worked Example 1.6

A minister provides inaccurate statistics in a statement to the House and only discovers the error weeks later.

Answer:
Under the Ministerial Code and individual responsibility, the minister must correct the record at the earliest opportunity and explain the error. If the misstatement was inadvertent, correction and apology suffice. If it was knowing or reckless, resignation is expected.

Key Point Checklist

This article has covered the following key knowledge points:

• Ministerial responsibility is a constitutional convention, not a legal rule.
• Collective responsibility requires ministers to publicly support government policy or resign; confidentiality protects frank Cabinet discussion.
• Collective responsibility can be set aside by the Prime Minister in narrow, exceptional cases (e.g., referendums or agreed coalition exceptions).
• Individual responsibility holds ministers accountable for departmental actions and personal conduct; knowingly misleading Parliament is expected to lead to resignation.
• The Carltona principle means ministers are accountable for actions taken by civil servants in their name; some functions may require personal ministerial exercise.
• Ministers have no immunity from court orders; injunctive relief and contempt can apply (e.g., M v Home Office), but courts do not enforce resignations or conventions.
• Parliamentary mechanisms such as questions, urgent questions, select committees (including the Liaison Committee), debates, and motions ensure ministerial accountability.
• The Ministerial Code codifies duties of candour, collective responsibility, openness, and oversight of civil servants giving evidence; enforcement is political.
• The distinction between accountability and responsibility is contested; Parliament expects both effective explanation and practical remedies to failures.

Key Terms and Concepts

• ministerial responsibility
• convention
• collective ministerial responsibility
• individual ministerial responsibility
• Carltona principle
• Ministerial Code