Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human R...

Learning Outcomes

This article details the transformative constitutional impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) on UK law, with a particular focus on its relation with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The content provides a comprehensive overview of the process of “bringing rights home” by making Convention rights directly justiciable in domestic courts, while retaining the core doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. It explores in depth the mechanisms by which ECHR rights are enforced in UK law, the interpretive requirements imposed on courts and tribunals, the creation and role of declarations of incompatibility, and the obligations imposed on public authorities. Learners will understand:

• How the HRA incorporates selected ECHR provisions into UK law, granting new, enforceable rights in domestic courts and the constitutional significance of this shift for the protection of fundamental freedoms.
• The obligation under s 2 HRA for UK courts and tribunals to take account of Strasbourg case law and the approach taken to the relationship between national judicial decision-making and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
• The interpretive duty imposed by s 3 HRA on courts to read and give effect to primary and subordinate legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights “so far as it is possible to do so,” and the limits of this duty, including what courts may and may not do in pursuit of compatibility.
• The function and legal consequences of a declaration of incompatibility under s 4 HRA, the discretionary nature of such declarations, their political (rather than legal) effect, and their use as a constitutional “pressure valve” to preserve the supremacy of Parliament.
• The concept of “public authority” in s 6 HRA, including the distinction between core and hybrid public authorities, the application to both state bodies and private entities performing public functions, and the effect of s 6(5) on private acts.
• The range of judicial and administrative remedies available under s 8 HRA, including the award of damages for “just satisfaction,” the remedial flexibility conferred on domestic courts, and the relationship with the remedies available in the ECtHR.
• The interaction between the HRA and fundamental constitutional concepts such as parliamentary sovereignty, the separation of powers, devolution arrangements, and the rule of law, including the evolving pattern of judicial review for violations of Convention rights.
• The enduring avenues for individuals to bring cases before the ECtHR after exhausting domestic remedies, and the implications for UK law of adverse Strasbourg judgments and the resulting international legal obligations.
• The relationship between the HRA and the broader UK constitutional framework, including administrative law, the independence of the judiciary, and the principle of legality in government action.

SQE1 Syllabus

• The method of incorporation of ECHR rights into UK domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998.
• The duty of courts to interpret primary and secondary legislation compatibly with Convention rights (s 3 HRA).
• The process and constitutional significance of issuing a declaration of incompatibility (s 4 HRA).
• The definition and scope of “public authority” and the duty under s 6 HRA.
• The nature of judicial remedies for human rights violations, with reference to the standards of just satisfaction under the ECHR and s 8 HRA.
• The effect of the HRA on parliamentary sovereignty and its relationship with the principle of the rule of law.
• The continued relevance and process for appeals to the European Court of Human Rights after domestic proceedings.

Test Your Knowledge

Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.

1. What must a UK court do under s 3 HRA when interpreting primary legislation?
2. What is the legal effect of a declaration of incompatibility under s 4 HRA?
3. Which bodies are subject to the duty to act compatibly with Convention rights under s 6 HRA?
4. Can a private company running a public service be a 'public authority' under the HRA?

Introduction

The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) significantly reshaped the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom by giving effect to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) within domestic law. Before the HRA, individuals seeking redress for violations of their ECHR rights had to exhaust all domestic remedies before applying to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg—a process often criticized for its expense and delay. The HRA was enacted to improve the protection of fundamental rights and “bring rights home,” enabling individuals to assert Convention rights in UK courts and thereby embedding these rights more deeply within the domestic legal system.

Key Term: Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)
The principal UK legislation that gives legal effect to selected ECHR rights in domestic law, creates a range of enforceable Convention rights and remedies in UK courts, and establishes procedures for their protection and enforcement.

Key Term: European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
An international treaty, drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, which establishes a body of fundamental civil and political rights, enforceable primarily by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

The HRA not only transformed the protection of individual rights in the UK legal order but also introduced complex interactions between domestic institutions, the European legal system, and constitutional doctrines such as the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty. The following sections detail how the HRA incorporates ECHR rights, the obligations it imposes on the courts, Parliament, and public authorities, and the resulting ramifications for UK law and government accountability.

Incorporation of Convention Rights

Section 1 of the HRA specifies which rights and freedoms in the ECHR and its Protocols are incorporated into UK law as “Convention rights,” and Schedule 1 sets these out in full. The Convention rights cover a wide range of civil and political liberties, such as the right to life, prohibition of torture, right to liberty and security, fair trial rights, respect for private and family life, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, assembly, association, and protection from discrimination. Each right has its own structure: some are absolute (such as the prohibition on torture), some are limited (such as the right to liberty, capable of restriction in defined legal circumstances), and others are qualified, permitting restrictions provided they are necessary in a democratic society and prescribed by law.

The HRA does not incorporate all provisions of the ECHR; notably, Article 1 (which imposes duties only on the contracting state) and Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) are not reproduced, as the HRA is conceived to ensure effective remedies within the UK itself. The HRA recognizes the dynamic interpretation of these rights by the ECtHR and aligns domestic understanding with the development of European human rights standards.

Restrictions on qualified rights (Articles 8-11 in particular) are justified only if they are “in accordance with law,” pursue a legitimate aim (such as national security or the protection of others’ rights and freedoms), and are proportionate—meaning they are no more restrictive than necessary to achieve their aim. The concept of proportionality has become central to UK rights adjudication, demanding a careful balancing of competing interests.

Taking Account of Strasbourg Case Law

Section 2 HRA provides that any court or tribunal determining a question involving a Convention right “must take into account” judgments, decisions, declarations, or advisory opinions of the ECtHR, as well as decisions of the former European Commission of Human Rights and relevant determinations of the Committee of Ministers. The phrase “take into account” reflects a deliberate statutory compromise between rigid incorporation of international law as binding in UK courts and the maintenance of judicial discretion. In practice, UK courts generally follow clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence—a position sometimes described as the “mirror principle”—unless there is a compelling reason rooted in domestic legal tradition or a specific feature of the national legal process justifies a different outcome.

Judicial dialogue between the UK Supreme Court and the ECtHR is an important feature of contemporary UK human rights law. For instance, the Supreme Court in R v Horncastle chose to depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence regarding the use of hearsay evidence where the domestic understanding of fair trial rights offered robust procedural protections not fully appreciated by the ECtHR. This carefully calibrated approach was subsequently acknowledged by the Strasbourg court, evidencing a reciprocal legal relationship.

Key Term: Strasbourg Jurisprudence
The body of case law developed by the ECtHR interpreting the ECHR. UK courts must “take into account” but are not formally bound by these decisions under s 2 HRA.

Section 2 ensures that UK law evolves alongside Convention interpretation but retains the latitude—though only in exceptional cases—to develop or maintain distinctive domestic approaches, especially where such divergence serves the interests of justice, reflects constitutional principles, or preserves the integrity of UK legal institutions.

The approach to Strasbourg law also underpins the principle that while the UK remains a party to the ECHR and the HRA is in force, Parliament can legislate contrary to Strasbourg standards or even repeal the HRA, subject only to political and international, not legal, constraint.

Interpreting Legislation Compatibly (s 3 HRA)

A central pillar of the HRA’s scheme is the interpretative obligation in s 3(1), requiring courts and tribunals, “so far as it is possible to do so,” to read and give effect to both primary and subordinate legislation in a way that is compatible with Convention rights. This obligation is not limited to ambiguous or new statutes: it applies to all legislation, past and future, and can require courts to depart from the ordinary meaning of words, adopt strained or additional interpretations, and even “read in” or “read down” statutory language to achieve compatibility, provided the change does not contravene a fundamental feature of the legislation or Parliament’s manifest intention.

Key Term: rule of law
A foundational constitutional principle mandating that all persons and branches of government are subject to and accountable under the law. The rule of law comprises legality, accessibility, equality, certainty, and access to justice.

Key Term: Interpretative Obligation (s 3 HRA)
The mandatory statutory duty for UK courts to interpret and give effect to legislation, “so far as possible,” in a manner compatible with the Convention rights.

The modern approach to statutory interpretation is thus heavily influenced by the HRA, with cases such as Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza marking a high-water mark for judicial creativity in ensuring rights compatibility. There, the House of Lords held that the words “living together as husband and wife” in housing legislation could be interpreted to include same-sex cohabitants, thus extending the benefit of succession to a same-sex survivor, in accordance with Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR.

However, s 3 is not a licence for the courts to rewrite statutes, circumvent express parliamentary intention, or alter a fundamental policy supporting the legislation. Where an interpretation necessary to achieve compatibility would contradict a central feature of the statute or go against its grain, the courts must refrain from using s 3 and may instead consider a declaration of incompatibility.

Worked Example 1.1

A statute states that only a 'spouse' may succeed to a tenancy. A same-sex civil partner seeks succession following the tenant's death. How should the court approach succession in light of s 3 HRA?

Answer:
Under s 3 HRA, the court must read the statute in a way that is compatible with Convention rights, particularly the right to respect for private and family life and the prohibition on discrimination. Applying Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, the court may interpret “spouse” to include a same-sex partner if this interpretation is consistent with the relevant purpose of the legislation and does not alter a fundamental aspect of it.

The s 3 obligation is mandatory and takes precedence over common law rules of construction. Nevertheless, it is not unlimited; where Parliament has been clear, and no compatible interpretation is genuinely open to the court, s 3 cannot be used to achieve an outcome equivalent to the judicial creation of new law.

Exam Warning

Section 3 does not allow courts to rewrite or amend the substance of legislation in contravention of Parliament’s clear intention. If the construction required to achieve Convention compatibility would undermine a central feature or create a result Parliament expressly sought to avoid, s 3 cannot be deployed, and other options, notably a declaration of incompatibility, must be considered.

Modern Interpretative Practice and Limits

The UK’s approach to interpreting statutes post-HRA involves several key features:

• The duty under s 3 applies even where the language used is unambiguous or appears clear on its face. Courts must strive for a rights-compatible reading unless this is impossible.
• Where a Convention-compliant construction would do violence to the structure or purpose of the Act, the court cannot go so far. Political accountability remains with Parliament.
• The judiciary continue to elaborate the boundaries of s 3 through subsequent decisions, repeatedly stressing the importance of respecting legislative intent, the nature of the statutory scheme, and the division of constitutional roles between courts and Parliament.

Declarations of Incompatibility (s 4 HRA)

When a compatible construction under s 3 is not possible, s 4 HRA allows the higher courts (the High Court and above) to make a declaration of incompatibility. This is a formal judicial statement that a legislative provision is inconsistent with Convention rights. Critically, a declaration does not invalidate or affect the operation of the legislation itself; it remains in force and effective, preserving the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

Key Term: Declaration of Incompatibility (s 4 HRA)
A formal judicial statement that a statutory provision is incompatible with a Convention right. It does not affect the validity or enforceability of the law, but signals the need for legislative attention.

The significance of s 4 lies in its capacity to flag up constitutional concern to Parliament and the executive, prompting reconsideration, reform, or repeal of the impugned law. Declarations are relatively rare, and the courts seek wherever possible to interpret legislation compatibly before resorting to this step. Once a declaration is made, there may be political and practical pressure for prompt legislative action.

Section 10 HRA enables the government to use a “remedial order” (i.e., fast-track delegated legislation) to correct an incompatibility where there are compelling reasons, thus providing for a relatively swift remedy in less controversial cases. However, recourse to remedial orders preserves Parliament’s ability to oversee and approve proposed changes, maintaining democratic accountability.

Declarations of incompatibility have been used in key areas of law, for example in R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (concerning the Home Secretary’s power to set the tariff for life sentence prisoners), as well as issues such as voting rights for prisoners and anti-terrorism measures.

Worked Example 1.2

A statute gives the Home Secretary discretion to set the minimum length of incarceration for life sentence prisoners. A prisoner argues this violates Article 6 ECHR, the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. The Supreme Court agrees that the statutory wording is clear and cannot be interpreted compatibly. What is the court’s response?

Answer:
The Supreme Court may issue a declaration of incompatibility under s 4 HRA, highlighting that the statutory scheme is inconsistent with a Convention right. The law remains valid and is enforced until Parliament chooses to amend or repeal it.

The HRA thus creates a constitutional dialogue between the courts and Parliament: the judiciary makes rights-based assessments and draws attention to incompatibilities, but final legislative authority, and the ability to address the problem or maintain the law, resides with Parliament.

The Constitutional Status of Declarations

Declarations of incompatibility play a constitutional “pressure valve” role. They prevent the UK from moving to a system of judicial supremacy, characteristic of countries with entrenched constitutional bills of rights, and instead maintain ultimate legislative control. Section 4(6) HRA makes clear that a declaration does not bind the parties or change the law. Nevertheless, most declarations of incompatibility have resulted in legislative reform, underlining the considerable political and practical weight these declarations carry.

Duty on Public Authorities (s 6 HRA)

Section 6(1) HRA makes it unlawful for a “public authority” to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right, unless required by primary legislation that allows no alternative (s 6(2)). This provision applies to a broad range of bodies: government departments, ministers, local authorities, police, courts, and tribunals, as well as private or voluntary bodies when exercising functions “of a public nature.”

Key Term: Public Authority (s 6 HRA)
Includes any court, tribunal, or person performing “functions of a public nature,” such as governmental authorities and private entities engaged in public service under contract or statute (hybrid authorities).

Courts have elaborated the scope of the public authority concept. A “core” public authority (e.g., local authority, police force, central government) is always subject to Convention obligations, while a “hybrid” or “functional” public authority may be so only when performing public functions. For instance, a private company running a prison under government contract acts as a public authority in that context but not when it acts in a purely private, non-public capacity.

The boundaries of what is a public function, and thus falls within s 6, depend on factors such as the body’s statutory powers, the use of public funding, the extent to which it assumes responsibility for governmental tasks, and the nature of the function at issue.

Worked Example 1.3

A local authority imposes a housing allocation policy that is alleged to discriminate against a minority group, contrary to Article 14 ECHR. Can an affected resident bring a claim under the HRA?

Answer:
Yes. The local authority is a core public authority and subject to the s 6 HRA requirement to act compatibly with Convention rights. An affected resident may challenge the policy in domestic courts as a breach of Convention rights.

Parliament itself, acting in its capacity as a legislature, is not regarded as a public authority for the purposes of s 6 (subject to the “no alternative” requirement under s 6(2)). This preserves parliamentary sovereignty and prevents the courts from invalidating primary legislation on human rights grounds.

Revision Tip

When determining whether a body is a public authority, the analysis should focus on the nature and context of the function being exercised, rather than the formal status of the organisation. Outsourcing of public services does not displace human rights obligations when those functions are inherently public.

Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Courts and tribunals are explicitly included as public authorities by s 6(3)(a) HRA. They are required, within their adjudicative function, to interpret and apply the law in a Convention-compatible way wherever possible, unless prevented from doing so by primary legislation which requires otherwise. This inclusion also means that the judiciary must ensure that the common law, where possible, is developed compatibly with ECHR rights, and that remedies are given in both public and private law disputes consistent with the Convention.

Remedies for Breach (s 8 HRA)

Section 8 HRA allows courts to grant any “relief or remedy or make such order within their powers as it considers just and appropriate” when they find that a public authority has acted unlawfully under s 6. This includes the full range of remedies typical in civil litigation, such as:

• Declarations (judicial recognition that rights have been breached)
• Injunctions and quashing orders
• Orders for specific performance or other appropriate measures
• Damages, awarded where necessary to afford “just satisfaction” (s 8(3))

Awards of damages are not automatic and will be made only where strictly necessary to provide redress. Courts must have regard to the principles and standards used by the ECtHR, ensuring that “just satisfaction” as understood in Strasbourg case law guides remedy design and quantum. English law traditionally favours non-monetary remedies for breaches of public law and only grants compensation where financial loss, distress, or unlawful deprivation are established in line with established principles.

Remedies under s 8 are discretionary and subject to the court’s general approach to proportionality, reasonableness, and compatibility with other domestic legal and procedural rules, including those relating to judicial restraint, the preservation of public funds, and the necessity to maintain the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive.

Section 7 HRA limits standing to a “victim” of the unlawful Act, as defined in Article 34 ECHR: the claimant must be directly and personally affected by the breach. This test ensures remedies are not available to groups or individuals with only a general or theoretical interest.

The Constitutional Impact of the HRA: Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Rule of Law

The incorporation of the ECHR into UK law by the HRA represents a significant constitutional development, greatly strengthening the enforceability and accessibility of fundamental rights. However, the HRA was carefully crafted to preserve the core concept of parliamentary sovereignty—a doctrine central to the UK’s uncodified constitution. Under both the ECHR and HRA, Parliament retains the authority to enact, amend, or repeal any law, including ones that conflict with the Convention or with rights as interpreted by Strasbourg or by UK courts. The courts cannot invalidate primary legislation for incompatibility with the ECHR; they are restricted to drawing Parliament’s attention to the conflict through a declaration of incompatibility.

Key Term: Parliamentary Sovereignty
The fundamental constitutional doctrine that Parliament is the supreme legal authority in the UK. It can make or repeal any law, and no court or other body can override or challenge the validity of its legislation.

This constitutional balance was highlighted in the cases of R (Jackson) v Attorney General and R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed both the power of Parliament and the new constitutional significance of Convention rights in UK law.

The HRA has also changed the nature of judicial review and administrative law. Before the HRA, grounds of review were generally limited to illegality, unreasonableness (Wednesbury), and procedural impropriety. The HRA creates a distinct ground—breach of Convention rights—for challenging administrative action. The courts, however, have reaffirmed that this extended role is not a license either for judicial overreach or for the removal of valid legal distinctions embodying parliamentary intent.

The Rule of Law, Judicial Independence, and Access to Justice

The effect of the HRA in upholding the rule of law is significant. The requirement for public authorities to operate within the framework of rights, the establishment of avenues for judicial enforcement, and the reinforcement of equality before the law all bolster the constitutional state. The obligation for government action to be prescribed by law and justiciable maintains the public’s trust in legal and political institutions. The HRA also strengthens the independence of the judiciary, ensuring courts maintain their important role in balancing competing interests, protecting rights, and supporting the effective functioning of a democratic society.

The Continued Role of the European Court of Human Rights

The HRA enables Convention rights to be enforced directly in UK courts, but individuals retain the right to petition the ECtHR in Strasbourg after exhausting domestic remedies. Proceedings in Strasbourg are initiated only after domestic resolutions have been sought and denied, ensuring subsidiary responsibility for the protection of rights lies with the UK courts.

While adverse judgments of the ECtHR are binding on the UK as a matter of international law, they do not automatically alter domestic law. Compliance usually requires legislative or executive action. In practice, the UK government typically takes steps to resolve incompatibilities, but the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that the UK Parliament is not compelled to change the law, as exemplified by the response to prisoners’ voting rights.

ECtHR case law continues to influence the development and practical interpretation of Convention rights in the UK due to the obligation under s 2 HRA to take these decisions into account, as well as the political and reputational consequences of repeat violations.

Relationship with Broader Constitutional Principles

Beyond its direct legal effects, the HRA has shaped how UK public law operates more broadly. The requirement for public authorities to act lawfully and respect rights strengthens the principle of legality, ensures accountability, and helps safeguard minority groups and vulnerable individuals. The HRA’s focus on proportionality as a standard for legitimacy in administrative and legislative action has fostered a human rights culture, influencing not only public law but also areas as diverse as contract, tort, family, and employment law.

Courts have also recognized that the HRA may have a “horizontal effect” where, in some circumstances, one private individual can rely on Convention rights in proceedings against another, notably where courts (as public authorities) are required to interpret and develop the common law compatibly with the ECHR (see Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers).

Devolution, Delegated Legislation, and Remedies

The effect of the HRA extends into devolved governments and legislatures. Legislation enacted by devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland must comply with Convention rights, and may be subject to challenge in the courts if it does not.

Subordinate legislation made under primary legislation is treated differently depending on the extent to which the incompatibility can be traced to the empowering Act or to the delegated authority. Courts may declare secondary legislation invalid where the primary Act did not require the offending provision, aligning with the HRA, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, and the broader constitutional tradition of checks and balances.

Remedies under the HRA are also tailored to maintain this constitutional balance. The principle of “just satisfaction” is reflected in s 8 HRA, meaning that remedies should be proportionate and address the nature of the harm, but also consider the limits of judicial competence in policymaking.

The HRA and Administrative Law

The HRA has expanded traditional grounds of judicial review, supplementing illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety with rights-based review. A “victim” of a violation by a public authority may rely on Convention rights in judicial review proceedings, and human rights can be invoked as a free-standing claim or as an additional basis within existing proceedings. This shift has resulted in a new dialogue between the courts and government, with careful attention to the relationship between the judiciary, executive, and Parliament.

The HRA and the Duty of the Courts

The HRA applies to courts and tribunals as public authorities, imposing duties to act compatibly with Convention rights unless bound by primary legislation. This has led to substantive and procedural changes in common law, with greater willingness to develop common law standards consistent with ECHR rights and to ensure effective remedies for rights violations, both in public and private law cases. The principle of “horizontal effect” ensures that Convention considerations apply throughout the entire legal system, requiring the courts to safeguard rights in disputes between private parties where appropriate.

The core duties to act with honesty, integrity, and the best interests of each client are enshrined in the SRA Principles and Code of Conduct and support the legal profession’s obligations regarding the upholding of human rights, the administration of justice, and the preservation of the rule of law.

Summary

Key Point Checklist

This article has covered the following key knowledge points:

• The Human Rights Act 1998 operationalises ECHR rights within UK law, enabling individuals to enforce these rights before domestic courts and tribunals.
• UK courts and tribunals must interpret and apply all legislation compatibly with Convention rights, so far as it is possible to do so, regardless of whether the statute is new, old, or unambiguous (s 3 HRA).
• Declarations of incompatibility under s 4 HRA do not strike down legislation but create strong constitutional and political pressure for remedial action by Parliament or the government.
• Public authorities, including core and hybrid authorities, must act compatibly with Convention rights in the exercise of all public functions (s 6 HRA), and courts will focus on the nature of the function rather than the formal status of the authority.
• A range of just and appropriate remedies, including damages, declarations, injunctions, and orders are available to victims who have suffered breaches of their Convention rights by public authorities (s 8 HRA), but these remedies are subject to the “just satisfaction” test derived from ECtHR case law and reflect appropriate restraint.
• Parliamentary sovereignty is preserved: Parliament may legislate contrary to or expressly repeal the Human Rights Act, and judicial declarations of incompatibility do not affect the validity of legislation in force.
• The HRA reinforces and operationalises the rule of law by mandating legal accountability for government action, ensuring access to justice, and strengthening equality before the law.
• The HRA requires UK courts to take Strasbourg case law into account and promotes a dialogue between domestic and European courts, but does not require blind adherence to ECtHR decisions where they do not reflect the unique circumstances of UK law and traditions.
• The HRA shapes the development and application of administrative law, requiring all public bodies to respect human rights and modifying traditional judicial review grounds.
• The HRA has horizontal impact, with courts serving as public authorities required to ensure that Convention rights are respected in private law disputes to the extent the common law permits.
• The HRA preserves and clarifies constitutional roles and relationships between the judiciary, Parliament, government, and devolved administrations.
• Individuals retain the right to petition the ECtHR after exhausting domestic remedies, and compliance with adverse Strasbourg judgments is a matter of international obligation for the UK.

Key Terms and Concepts

• Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)
• European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
• Strasbourg Jurisprudence
• Interpretative Obligation (s 3 HRA)
• Declaration of Incompatibility (s 4 HRA)
• Public Authority (s 6 HRA)
• rule of law
• Parliamentary Sovereignty