PastPaperHero | Sentencing - Ancillary orders (e.g., compensation, disqualification)

Learning Outcomes

This article covers ancillary orders in criminal sentencing, including:

identifying the statutory sources, purposes and core mechanics of compensation, disqualification, deprivation and confiscation orders across key statutes
distinguishing mandatory, presumed and purely discretionary ancillary powers, and recognising when courts must consider, impose, or justify refusing orders
applying statutory prioritisation rules where offender means are limited, especially giving compensation precedence over fines, costs and surcharges
assessing how ancillary orders interact with principal sentences, ensuring the overall package remains proportionate and avoids double punishment or duplication
evaluating when disqualification, deprivation or confiscation is necessary for public protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, or removal of criminal property and profit
addressing special considerations for children and young persons, aligning ancillary orders with the welfare principle and youth sentencing guidelines
constructing clear, exam-focused reasoning to justify, refuse, or structure ancillary orders in realistic sentencing scenarios, with attention to evidence and means
recognising common exam traps, such as failing to prioritise compensation, misusing deprivation where confiscation is appropriate, or overlooking third-party interests

SQE1 Syllabus

For SQE1, you are required to understand ancillary orders in criminal sentencing, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

statutory powers authorising ancillary orders (Sentencing Code 2020, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, and related statutes)
distinction between mandatory and discretionary ancillary orders, including when courts must consider or must give reasons for not imposing them
prioritisation and interaction of financial orders (including compensation orders before fines, costs and other sums where means are limited)
scope and limits of compensation orders: causation, quantification, apportionment across multiple victims, and enforcement
driving and other disqualification orders: mandatory versus discretionary disqualification, special reasons, totting-up, and proportionality
deprivation orders versus confiscation orders: aims, property scope, third-party interests, and enforcement
POCA confiscation procedure: benefit, recoverable amount, lifestyle assumptions, proportionality, default terms, and interaction with compensation
special considerations for children and young persons: welfare, Sentencing Children and Young People Definitive Guidelines, and tailored use of ancillary orders

Test Your Knowledge

Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.

In which circumstances must a court consider making a compensation order?
What is the difference between a deprivation order and a confiscation order?
Can a court impose a driving disqualification for offences not involving a vehicle?
What principle governs the amount of compensation ordered when the offender has limited means?

Introduction

Ancillary orders are statutory orders imposed by the criminal courts alongside the principal sentence. These orders do not serve the core punitive function of sentencing, such as imprisonment, community service, or fines. Instead, they target specific consequences—reparation to victims, protection of the public, reduction of risk, rehabilitation, or removal of criminal property and advantage. The grounds and mechanisms for these orders are governed by various statutes, with well-defined powers, limitations, and procedures that courts must apply and justify in each case.

Key Term: ancillary order
An order made by the court in addition to the main sentence, addressing compensation, disqualification, deprivation, or other prescribed statutory outcomes.

The imposition of ancillary orders may be mandatory or discretionary, and courts are generally obliged to consider, and in some cases give priority to, particular orders, especially those that aid reparation to victims or prevent further offending. Critically, ancillary orders often have substantial and sometimes long-lasting effects: they may reshape a defendant’s employment, financial circumstances, civil rights, or liberties, and in some cases, overlap or interact with civil remedies or regulatory sanctions.

Ancillary Orders: Overview and Statutory Basis

Ancillary orders derive authority primarily from the Sentencing Code 2020 (SC 2020), which consolidates the statutory framework for sentencing powers in England and Wales. Additional specialist statutes supplement powers for particular contexts, including, for example, the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 for directorship bans and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for confiscation of criminal proceeds. Statutory powers clarify:

Which types of ancillary orders a court may make in connection with particular offences or offender profiles
Whether the order’s imposition is mandatory, discretionary, or subject to a rebuttable presumption
The specific statutory criteria and procedural safeguards required (including considerations of proportionality and offender circumstances)
Circumstances demanding judicial reasoning—courts must record reasons when not imposing an order that statute otherwise requires

Key Term: statutory power
The legal authority, generally found in statute, which enables a court to impose an ancillary order.

Ancillary orders most relevant for SQE1 include:

Compensation orders (direct victim reparation)
Disqualification orders (driving, professional, or public office bans)
Deprivation orders (removal of property used for crime)
Confiscation orders (forfeiture of criminal benefit)

Each operates to achieve distinct objectives, and it is essential to distinguish their statutory basis, scope of application, and procedural requirements. Courts must always ensure compliance with statutory priorities and consider the cumulative effect of ancillary and principal sentences.

Courts may make multiple ancillary orders alongside the principal sentence. When doing so, careful reasoning is necessary to ensure that the combined impact remains proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s circumstances, conforms with statutory priorities and does not amount to double punishment. Courts must also consider whether any ancillary order would undermine rehabilitation or be counterproductive to public protection.

Compensation Orders

A compensation order compels an offender to pay a specified sum to the victim for direct loss, damage, or injury arising from the offence (SC 2020, s.130). The power to make a compensation order is central to restorative sentencing, and courts must actively consider its imposition in every case where any identifiable loss or injury results from the crime.

Key Term: compensation order
An order requiring the offender to pay compensation to the victim for loss, damage, or injury resulting from the offence.

Statutory Duty to Consider and Prioritise

Courts are under a statutory duty to consider making a compensation order whenever loss, injury, or damage is reported—this applies irrespective of whether the principal sentence is custodial, community-based, or a fine. Reasons must be recorded if the court decides not to make a compensation order, for example, due to insufficient evidence of loss or the insignificance of injury.

SC 2020, s.130 expressly states that compensation orders should be considered and, where made, take priority over fines or other financial penalties. The rationale is to secure victim restitution above penal revenue for the state.

If the offender lacks means, the court must still consider what can realistically be paid, favouring instalments or partial compensation rather than omitting the order.
Decisions on quantum should be informed by the evidence, proportionality, and the offender’s financial circumstances.

Courts should also be alert to the potential duplication of recovery where there are parallel insurance claims or civil proceedings. The criminal compensation order should target direct loss from the offence and avoid compensating for speculative heads of claim (e.g., complex consequential loss more suited to civil litigation). If civil proceedings later yield further recovery, amounts paid under a criminal compensation order are to be deducted from any civil award to prevent double recovery.

Where the offender has committed multiple offences, or there are multiple victims, the court can apportion compensation across victims and offences, explaining the rationale for any allocation. Priority may be given to victims suffering personal injury or immediate financial hardship.

Scope of Compensation Orders

Compensation orders can include:

Physical injury, pain, and suffering (including psychological injury, loss of amenity), where causation is established and injury is not de minimis
Economic loss (e.g., repair costs, replacement value, medical fees, travel expenses for treatment or court attendance)
Loss of earnings and treatment costs resulting from the offence, provided causation and amount are established with reasonable certainty

The award must be directly attributable to the conduct for which the offender is convicted, so courts must avoid compensating loss for unrelated or speculative damages. A compensation order should reflect the principle of making good, where feasible, the loss or damage caused by the offending.

Compensation orders do not prevent victims from seeking civil remedies for losses that exceed the sum ordered. However, double recovery is prohibited: the victim must give credit for sums paid under the compensation order.

Multiple victims: Where more than one victim suffers loss, courts may apportion compensation—each award must be justified, and reasons given for allocation (especially if full compensation to all is impossible).

Compensation is not punitive; rather, it aims for practical restoration. Courts should avoid awarding compensatory sums that exceed the loss and should consider whether modest sums will suffice where evidence is limited.

Evidence and Proof

The court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities as to the amount of loss for the purpose of a compensation order. While the criminal standard applies to the conviction, evidential sufficiency for quantification can be based on reasonable estimates supported by documentation (e.g., invoices, medical reports, wage slips, photographs of damage). Where evidence is sparse or the sums are disputed, courts may award a reduced amount or adjourn briefly for clarification if proportionate and practicable.

In personal injury cases, courts should exercise caution and avoid complex assessments better suited to the civil courts. Nonetheless, modest awards for pain, suffering, and loss of amenity are appropriate where medical evidence or clear injury is shown. For property damage, repair invoices or quotes are commonly sufficient.

Assessment of Amount: Principles and Constraints

Assessment involves balancing restorative justice with the reality of the offender’s means. Courts must:

Calculate an appropriate sum based on proven loss, ensuring the order is not excessive or impossible to comply with
Avoid setting compensation at levels that compromise rehabilitation prospects or unduly penalise offenders who have no immediate ability to pay
Clearly prioritize compensation over fines: when funds are limited, compensation is deducted first, and only residual sums are allocated toward fines or other financial penalties

Where appropriate, courts should set orders to be payable by instalment, or opt for a reduced lump sum reflecting the offender’s means. The welfare of the offender, especially for young persons or those with care responsibilities, is relevant.

Compensation orders must include a payment timeframe. If the offender defaults, enforcement proceeds as for other financial penalties (e.g., collection orders, attachment of earnings, deduction from benefits, or committal in extreme cases). Courts can vary payment terms (e.g., instalments) upon change of circumstances but cannot increase the total sum beyond the original order unless rescinded and remade on lawful grounds.

Insurance and Civil Claims

In offences arising from road traffic incidents or property damage where insurance may cover the loss, courts should consider whether the victim is likely to be indemnified. The presence of insurance does not bar a compensation order, but the court may adjust the amount or direct timing (e.g., contingent on insurance outcomes) to prevent duplication. Any sums later recovered from insurers should be offset.

Costs, Surcharges and Priority

SC 2020 emphasises that compensation must take priority over fines, prosecution costs and the victim surcharge where offender means are limited. Courts should determine the total amount the offender can realistically pay and allocate to compensation first. Costs orders and surcharges should be moderated or omitted where necessary to ensure that compensation is paid. Where a confiscation order is also contemplated, the court must consider compensation first, then ensure the confiscation calculation and enforcement arrangements avoid double counting and remain proportionate.

Worked Example 1.1

A defendant is convicted of criminal damage after breaking a shop window. The repair cost is £600. The defendant has limited income. What must the court do?

Answer:
The court must consider making a compensation order for the £600 loss. Compensation has priority over any fine. The court should take account of the defendant’s limited means, perhaps ordering payment by instalments or reducing the amount if full payment is unrealistic at one time. Reasons must be given if a compensation order is not made.

Compensation Orders and Multiple Financial Penalties

Where courts contemplate both compensation and fines or costs, SC 2020, s.135 mandates that compensation be afforded priority. The court must determine the total amount the offender can pay, allocate compensation first, and consider whether there is capacity for a fine. This discipline ensures victim restitution is not undermined by parallel financial penalties.

Where the offender’s means are highly constrained, the court may decline to impose a fine altogether if doing so would frustrate payment of compensation. If costs are sought, the court should adjust them to a nominal figure or not order costs if that would impair compensation. The victim surcharge (which funds victim services) should be set in accordance with statutory provisions, but the court should recognise that it does not displace compensation as a priority.

Application to Youth Offenders

For children and young persons (aged 10–17), the application of compensation orders requires additional care. The Sentencing Children and Young People Definitive Guidelines stress that sentencing should support rehabilitation and prevent unnecessary criminalisation or hardship.

Compensation orders may be made against youths where loss or injury results, but the court must consider the offender’s age, maturity, likely ability to pay, and the impact on welfare. Orders should not jeopardise the young person’s reintegration into society. A parent or guardian may be ordered to pay on the youth’s behalf, subject to the court’s assessment of the family’s means and the circumstances.

Courts should favour modest sums and instalments for youths, particularly where education or basic living standards would otherwise be imperilled. The purpose remains to encourage responsibility and reparation without undermining welfare.

Worked Example 1.2

A 14-year-old is convicted of causing damage to a neighbour’s car. The repair costs are £400. The youth is unemployed and lives with a single parent.

Answer:
The court must consider a compensation order for £400. Given the youth’s inability to pay, the court may order the parent to pay (if appropriate), or may structure payment in instalments. The order must not be excessive and must be designed to avoid compromising welfare or educational prospects.

Exam Warning

If a statute mandates consideration of a compensation order and the court decides not to make one, clear reasons must be recorded. Failure to give reasons is an error and may lead to appeal or reconsideration. Pay particular attention to priority: compensation should not be displaced by fines or costs where means are limited.

Disqualification Orders

Disqualification orders prohibit an offender from engaging in specific activities (such as driving, acting as a director, or working in regulated roles), where the offence or the offender’s behavior merits exclusion for protection of the public or deterrence of further offending.

Key Term: disqualification order
An order prohibiting the offender from engaging in specified activities (e.g., driving, acting as a company director, holding public office) for a set period, to protect the public and prevent reoffending.

The imposition of disqualification orders will depend on the statutory context, the seriousness of the offence, and a clear need for public protection. Disqualification is generally preventive, rather than punitive. Courts should articulate why disqualification is necessary and proportionate in the circumstances, addressing risk, deterrence and, where relevant, rehabilitation.

Driving Disqualification

Driving disqualification is largely governed by the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 and related road traffic legislation, with the SC 2020 consolidating sentencing practice. Disqualification arises in three common contexts:

Mandatory disqualification for specified offences (e.g., dangerous driving, drink/drug driving, causing death by careless or dangerous driving). The court must impose a disqualification unless “special reasons” directly connected to the offence justify departure.
Totting-up disqualification (where penalty points reach 12 or more within a three-year period). The court must normally disqualify for at least six months unless exceptional hardship is established on evidence.
Discretionary disqualification for other offences where the circumstances merit exclusion (e.g., repeated serious non-motoring offences demonstrating disregard for law), used sparingly and with clear justification.

The court specifies the period of disqualification proportionate to seriousness and risk. Where interim disqualification has been imposed pending sentence, statutory schemes allow that period to be taken into account in fixing the ultimate disqualification to ensure fairness.

Courts may impose additional measures: an extended re-test requirement, or a requirement to pass a driving test before restoration of licence. If the offender was unlicensed or uninsured, disqualification may still be imposed to protect the public.

Special Reasons versus Exceptional Hardship

“Special reasons” are mitigating circumstances relating to the offence itself (not the offender’s personal circumstances) that justify not disqualifying or reducing the period (e.g., driving a short distance due to a medical emergency). “Exceptional hardship” is relevant in totting-up cases and focuses on consequences for the offender and others (e.g., impact on dependent care, job loss causing disproportionate hardship). Both are narrow and must be proved on evidence; the court must record reasons clearly.

Offences Not Involving Vehicles

Disqualification can be imposed even where the offence is not a motoring offence if statute confers the power and the court finds exclusion from driving necessary to protect the public (e.g., repeated dangerous conduct closely connected to use of vehicles, or offences suggesting grave irresponsibility). This is rare and demands a robust rationale tied to risk.

Disqualification from Directorship and Professional Activities

Disqualification from company directorship and involvement in company management arises under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA). Where an offender is convicted of an offence in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a company, or of dishonesty relevant to company management, the court may disqualify for a period commensurate with seriousness (typically 2–15 years).

Factors include:

Nature and seriousness of the offence (dishonesty, fraud, market harm)
Role and responsibility (director, shadow director, senior manager)
Duration and planning of misconduct
Harm to creditors, investors or the public, and risk of recurrence

The court should identify whether the disqualification category falls into the commonly recognised bands (lower culpability misconduct: 2–5 years; medium seriousness: 6–10 years; high seriousness/widespread dishonesty: 11–15 years). The order may include prohibitions on company management and acting as a director. Breach is a separate offence.

Other professional and regulatory disqualifications derive from sectoral statutes and protective regimes. Illustrative examples include:

Disqualification from keeping animals (Animal Welfare Act 2006) following serious cruelty offences
Disqualification or barring from working with children or vulnerable adults under safeguarding frameworks (Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and DBS barring decisions), supplemented by Sexual Harm Prevention Orders where relevant
Firearms prohibition orders, licence revocation and disqualification arising under firearms legislation
Football banning orders under the Football Spectators Act 1989 for violence or disorder connected to football matches

Courts must ensure disqualification is proportionate and aligned with risk reduction and public protection. Where rehabilitation would be undermined by a lengthy disqualification inconsistent with risk, the court should explain why a more tailored approach is appropriate.

Worked Example 1.3

A defendant is convicted of fraud while acting as a company director. What ancillary order may the court consider?

Answer:
The court may impose a disqualification order under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, barring the defendant from being a director or managing a company for a period determined by the seriousness and context of the offending. The order prevents further harm by restricting involvement in company affairs.

Revision Tip

Differentiate “special reasons” (offence-related mitigation for drink/drug or dangerous driving) from “exceptional hardship” (consequences to the offender/others in totting-up). Only the former allows departure from mandatory disqualification for the offence; the latter applies to totting-up periods.

Additional Practical Features

Disqualification orders are generally imposed in addition to the main sentence and may overlap, supplement, or interact with other regulatory or civil prohibitions. Courts must specify the duration, ensure the subject is aware of any mechanisms for appeal or review, and explain the consequences of breach (often further criminal penalties or enhanced period of disqualification).

Where disqualification affects livelihood (e.g., driving essential to employment), courts should acknowledge impact but prioritise public protection and deterrence. If impact amounts to exceptional hardship in totting-up cases, the court may reduce or avoid disqualification on strong evidence and clear reasons.

Deprivation Orders

Deprivation orders serve to confiscate property used or intended for use in the commission or facilitation of an offence, as authorized mainly by the Sentencing Code 2020 and complemented by separate statutes for particular categories (e.g., firearms or vehicles).

Key Term: deprivation order
An order depriving the offender of property used in or intended for use in committing the offence, with the objective of preventing further offending and removing the tools of crime.

Purpose and Operation

The central aim is to remove from the offender those means, tools, or assets that have facilitated criminal behaviour, thereby protecting the public and deterring future offending. The court may order forfeiture and lawful disposal of:

Vehicles used in the commission of offences (e.g., poaching, uninsured driving, transporting illicit goods)
Weapons or equipment (e.g., knives, firearms, burglary tools)
Electronic devices (e.g., computers used in fraud, mobile phones in drug trafficking cases)

The property in question must be directly linked to the offence, either used or intended for use. Statute demands that deprivation be justified by the needs of justice and proportionate; unnecessary or excessively punitive forfeiture is not permitted.

Where specific statutory regimes exist (e.g., firearms confiscation and prohibition orders), courts should use those tailored powers. In the general case, deprivation requires the court to identify the tight nexus between the property and the offending and to consider whether removal of the property will reduce risk of reoffending.

Consideration of Third-Party Interests and Proportionality

Where property subject to deprivation is owned jointly with third parties, or where innocent interests intervene (e.g., leased items, co-owned vehicles), courts are required to consider the rights and interests of third parties before making a deprivation order. The court should avoid depriving an innocent third party of property or imposing hardship on them absent a statutory basis and proper findings.

Proportionality is key: courts must assess not only the value but also the offender’s circumstances, relevance to future offending, and avoidance of hardship unnecessary for the protection of the public. Deprivation should not normally be ordered for high-value items where a minor incident occurred, without strong justification, because this may become punitive rather than preventive.

Where the property is necessary for legitimate livelihood and the offending is an isolated incident, courts should carefully justify any deprivation—or decline to order it—explaining why lesser measures (e.g., fines, compensation, or disqualification) would not suffice.

Disposal, Return and Enforcement

Deprived property may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as provided by statute or court order. Where the order is later quashed or varied on appeal, the court should address practical consequences (including return or compensation where appropriate). Breach of an order (e.g., attempting to recover or use deprived property unlawfully) may amount to contempt or a separate offence.

Worked Example 1.4

A defendant is convicted of poaching using a vehicle and firearms. What may the court order?

Answer:
The court may make a deprivation order for both the vehicle and firearms used in committing the offence. The order deprives the defendant of ownership and permits lawful disposal—preventing future use in similar crimes and deterring future offending.

Deprivation orders are applied with care to ensure the property has a clear nexus to the proven wrongdoing and that no excessive punitive consequence arises outside the statutory scheme.

Confiscation Orders

Key Term: confiscation order
An order requiring the offender to pay an amount equivalent to the benefit obtained from criminal conduct, made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA).

Confiscation orders seek to strip offenders of the proceeds and profits accrued by criminal conduct, operating as a financial remedy distinct from fines or deprivation. Confiscation is concerned with the offender’s gain, not the victim’s loss, and is designed to deter crime and ensure criminals do not retain benefit.

Statutory Powers and Procedure

Under POCA, confiscation proceedings are generally mandatory if the prosecution requests them and the statutory conditions are met. The court must:

Determine whether the offender has benefited from criminal conduct (particular or general). “Benefit” includes obtaining property, money or pecuniary advantage. In “lifestyle” cases, statutory assumptions allow the court to treat certain transfers, expenditures and assets as derived from criminal conduct unless the offender rebuts the assumptions.
Calculate the recoverable amount as the lesser of the value of the benefit and the value of the offender’s available assets (the “realisable” amount) at the time the order is made (including jointly held assets to the extent of the offender’s interest).
Make a confiscation order for the recoverable amount, specifying time to pay and default terms (which can involve significant further custody if payment is not made).
Consider proportionality: the order must not be disproportionate under the European Convention on Human Rights protections (e.g., Article 1 of Protocol 1). Courts may adjust calculations to avoid excess (e.g., where benefit calculation is artificial or double counts legitimate transactions), ensuring the order remains just.

POCA provides mechanisms for reconsideration and variation where circumstances change (e.g., identification of hidden assets or changes in available amount). Enforcement can include restraint of assets, appointment of enforcement receivers, and civil enforcement measures.

Confiscation is distinct from deprivation: it targets financial gain from criminal conduct, not a specific item used in offending. It may require the offender to sell lawful property to satisfy the order.

Interaction with Compensation and Other Ancillary Orders

Where both compensation and confiscation orders may be available, SC 2020’s prioritisation principle requires that compensation to the victim is considered first. Courts should avoid double counting and explain whether sums paid under one order will be set off against the other where appropriate.

POCA permits the court to direct that sums recovered under confiscation be applied to satisfy compensation orders. Courts should state clearly whether and to what extent payments will be credited across orders, and they should ensure the confiscation figure reflects any compensation awarded to prevent duplication.

Courts should also consider whether confiscation would undermine rehabilitation or be disproportionate in the circumstances, adjusting the recoverable amount to reflect legitimate assets and transactions. Where the offender’s means are limited, time to pay and staged enforcement may be appropriate.

Worked Example 1.5

An offender is convicted of operating a fraudulent investment scheme and has gained £85,000. The prosecution requests confiscation proceedings under POCA.

Answer:
The court must assess the benefit obtained, calculate the recoverable amount (not exceeding realisable assets) and make a confiscation order for £85,000 unless satisfied such benefit cannot be recovered. If the offender cannot pay, enforcement measures and further imprisonment may follow.

Lifestyle Assumptions and Particular Conduct

In lifestyle cases (e.g., where offences fall within statutory schedules, or the offending is deemed part of a pattern), the court applies assumptions that assets acquired within a defined period are tainted by criminal conduct unless the offender rebuts them. This broadens the scope of confiscation beyond the immediate offence. In non-lifestyle cases, the court assesses benefit from the particular conduct proved.

Courts must scrutinise evidence carefully to avoid attributing legitimate, taxed income or gifts to criminal benefit without sufficient basis. If the assumptions are unrealistic or produce disproportionate results, the court should limit their application.

Default Terms and Enforcement

Failure to pay a confiscation order by the due date may trigger default terms of imprisonment, scaled to the amount outstanding. Serving a default term does not extinguish the debt; the outstanding sum remains enforceable. Interest may accrue on unpaid amounts. The court can extend time to pay where justified by evidence (e.g., ongoing asset sale).

POCA provides for enforcement receivers, freezing of assets, and contempt powers where the offender attempts to frustrate enforcement. Courts should give explicit warnings regarding default terms and enforcement steps when imposing the order.

Deprivation vs. Confiscation

A deprivation order targets specific property used in the commission of crime with the aim of prevention—e.g., seizing a getaway vehicle used in theft. A confiscation order, conversely, targets the financial benefit from criminal conduct regardless of any one item’s connection to the specific offence—e.g., ordering payment of illegal profits, which may require selling or surrendering unrelated assets.

Deprivation is immediate, property-focused, for public protection; confiscation is financial, benefit-focused, for deterrence and stripping criminal gains. Where both may be relevant, courts should keep their distinct aims in view and avoid overlap in purpose or effect. Deprivation should not be used to penalise wealth, nor confiscation used to remove tools of crime—each has its proper domain.

When both orders are imposed, courts should consider whether deprivation undermines the offender’s ability to satisfy compensation or confiscation. If so, careful timing or adjustment of sums may be necessary to preserve proportionality and statutory priorities.

Principles Governing Ancillary Orders

Courts exercise their powers over ancillary orders in line with basic sentencing principles: proportionality, necessity, rehabilitation, public protection, and avoidance of undue hardship.

Proportionality: The order must fit the seriousness of the offence and offender circumstances, neither unduly punitive nor so lenient as to undermine statutory intent.
Necessity: Ancillary orders should be imposed only where they address a real risk, requirement, or loss arising from the offending.
Victim Compensation: Compensation is prioritized before financial penalties; victim restitution is the primary objective where loss or injury occurs.
Public Protection: Orders like disqualification, deprivation, and confiscation serve to prevent re-offending, and protect the community—always justified by evidence, not presumption.
Court Reasoning: Where statute requires consideration of an order (e.g., compensation) or sets out a presumption (e.g., driving disqualification), explicit recorded reasons must be given if the court decides against making an order.
Interaction of Orders: Courts must avoid duplication and ensure that the cumulative effect of all imposed sentences and orders does not exceed what is proportionate or justified.

In each case, the court balances harm caused, offender culpability, motivation, previous convictions, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances (including age, health, capacity, and background). The court must consider offender means and the feasibility of compliance, tailoring payment schedules, durations and conditions accordingly.

Worked Example 1.6

An offender is convicted of dangerous driving causing injury to a pedestrian. The pedestrian suffered lost earnings and medical expenses. The offender’s only asset is a modest vehicle used in the offence.

Answer:
The court must consider a compensation order for lost earnings and medical costs. A deprivation order for the vehicle may also be justified, given its use in the crime. Compensation is prioritized; deprivation must be proportionate (taking account of the offender’s means and the impact on rehabilitation).

Worked Example 1.7

A defendant is convicted of repeated drink-driving offences resulting in a totting-up of points above 12 within three years. They argue exceptional hardship due to caring responsibilities.

Answer:
The court must impose a totting-up disqualification unless persuaded on evidence that exceptional hardship exists. If disqualification would cause disproportionate hardship to dependants, the court may reduce or avoid disqualification and must record clear reasons. This is distinct from special reasons, which relate to the offence itself.

Interaction with the Main Sentence

Ancillary orders, while not punitive in themselves, can significantly impact the overall sentencing outcome:

A compensation order may reduce funds available for fines or costs and is the first charge on the offender’s limited means.
Disqualification orders restrict opportunities for employment and civil rights—especially marked in driving or professional bans.
Deprivation of property can result in significant financial loss and affect livelihood, especially if the property is of considerable value or essential to employment.
Confiscation orders may precipitate further custody if not satisfied, and may involve forced sale of assets.

In addition, multiple ancillary orders may expose an offender to overlapping sanctions. Courts must guard against excessive penalization—particularly where ancillary orders compound the hardship of a principal custodial or community sentence.

A careful assessment of total impact is required, with courts obliged to avoid “double punishment” or excessive cumulative severity, especially when the offender’s means are marginal and prospects for rehabilitation could be impaired.

Courts should also consider sequencing and interaction—e.g., imposing deprivation only after determining compensation and confiscation feasibility, or structuring time to pay for confiscation to allow compliance. Where breach of an ancillary order may result in further sanctions, courts should explain consequences at sentence.

Special Considerations for Children and Young Persons

When imposing ancillary orders on children and youths, courts must apply the welfare principle from the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and the Sentencing Children and Young People Definitive Guidelines. Orders must be proportionate, avoid unnecessary criminalisation, and support rehabilitation and reintegration.

Key statutory and judicial guidelines require that:

Orders (including compensation and deprivation) reflect the youth’s age, maturity, and individual circumstances; payment levels and methods must be manageable, and may involve parental responsibility where justified.
Disqualification or prohibition orders (e.g., driving bans, exclusion from certain activities) must be justified by demonstrable public interest and should avoid long-term exclusion disproportionate to the offence or to the youth’s prospects.
Welfare takes precedence over strict punishment; the aim is to prevent offending, encourage responsibility, and support future rehabilitation.

Courts may prefer reparative measures (e.g., referral orders and YRO conditions) that include reparation or restorative activity over harsh ancillary measures that risk breach or undermine welfare. Where a custodial sentence is imposed (DTO), ancillary orders should be calibrated to support reintegration upon release.

Worked Example 1.8

A 15-year-old is convicted of theft and criminal damage causing £250 in loss. The youth has limited means and lives with parents.

Answer:
The court must consider a compensation order of £250, with the youth’s age, lack of income, and family circumstances making payment difficult. Instalments or parental payment may be ordered, ensuring the amount is not excessive and does not hinder the youth’s welfare or rehabilitation.

Youth Sentences: Referral Orders, YROs, and DTOs

While not strictly ancillary, understanding youth-specific sentencing orders is essential for context. Referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders (YROs), and detention and training orders (DTOs) are principal sentences for offenders aged 10–17, but may also involve restorative conditions—such as reparative activity, engagement with Youth Offender Panels, and compliance with victim restitution or community service.

The Sentencing Children and Young People Definitive Guideline places emphasis on the offender’s personal development, welfare, likelihood of reoffending, and future prospects. Orders are tailored and must not be so onerous as to induce breach or cause unnecessary hardship. For YROs, requirements must be proportionate to offence seriousness and age/maturity, and reparation or activity requirements may complement compensation orders.

Enforcement and Reconsideration

Non-compliance with ancillary orders may trigger enforcement action—ranging from financial sanctions for unpaid compensation, enhanced periods or conditions for disqualification, to further imprisonment for default in payment under confiscation orders. Statutory mechanisms exist for reconsideration or appeal in specific circumstances (e.g., extension of time to pay for confiscation; variation of compensation payment terms; review of disqualification upon changed circumstances). Courts should inform the offender clearly about conditions, consequences of breach, and available routes for variation or appeal.

Worked Example 1.9

A defendant is convicted of fraud and the court imposes both a compensation order (£20,000 to the primary victim) and a confiscation order (£50,000 benefit, £40,000 available assets). The defendant has limited liquid assets and a mortgaged home.

Answer:
The court should prioritise compensation and may direct that sums recovered under confiscation be applied to satisfy the compensation order first. The recoverable amount for confiscation should reflect available assets and be proportionate. Time to pay may be granted to allow asset realisation. The court must explain how payments will be credited to avoid double counting.

Summary

Ancillary orders are a key part of the sentencing regime in criminal law, supplementing principal sentences by prioritising restitution to victims, safeguarding the public, and ensuring criminals do not profit from offending. The Sentencing Code 2020 and related statutes specify the circumstances, procedures, and priorities for imposing such orders. Courts must exercise judgement to ensure each order is justified and proportionate, giving effect to statutory priorities (with compensation favoured) and supporting rehabilitation—especially for children and young persons.

Case-specific reasoning, transparency, and attention to cumulative burden are essential, particularly when imposing disqualification, deprivation, and confiscation orders, and when offenders have limited means. Youth offenders require tailored orders that protect welfare and support reintegration.

Key Point Checklist

This article has covered the following key knowledge points:

Ancillary orders are supplementary orders made alongside the principal sentence in criminal cases.
Statutory powers—often in the Sentencing Code 2020—govern when and how ancillary orders can be made.
The most relevant ancillary orders for SQE1 are compensation, disqualification, deprivation, and confiscation orders.
The court must consider a compensation order in every case where loss or injury is caused and provide reasons if not making such an order.
Compensation takes priority over fines or other financial penalties; the court must assess total offender means.
Disqualification orders may prohibit driving, holding positions of trust, or particular forms of employment as a means of protecting the public.
Disqualification may be mandatory or discretionary, and courts must justify departures from the statutory presumption.
Deprivation orders remove items used in or for committing offences from the offender’s control, but must account for third-party interests and avoid undue harshness.
Confiscation orders ensure that offenders do not retain the benefit of their crimes, with orders calculated under POCA and enforced by financial and custodial sanctions.
Ancillary orders must be proportionate, necessary, and based on clearly identified statutory powers.
Courts must give explicit, case-specific reasons if not imposing an order where required by law.
For children and young persons, the welfare principle shapes the imposition and nature of ancillary orders.
Sentencing practice requires detailed consideration of the interaction and prioritisation of orders (e.g., compensation over fines), and the overall impact on rehabilitation and future offending.

Key Terms and Concepts

ancillary order
compensation order
disqualification order
deprivation order
confiscation order
statutory power

Sentencing - Ancillary orders (e.g., compensation, disqualif...